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There is renewed interest in why people of lower socio-economic status (SES) have 
worse health outcomes.  No matter which measures of SES are used (income, wealth, or 
education), the evidence that this association is large is abundant (Marmot (1999), Smith (1999)).  
The relation between SES and health appears also to be pervasive over time and across countries 
at quite different levels of economic development (Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), Townsend et al. 
(1988)).  Considerable debate remains about why the relation arises and what the principal 
directions of causation might be ((Smith (1999), Adams et al. (2003), Deaton (2003)).  However, 
many analytical difficulties exist when one tries to understand its meaning.  These difficulties 
include the complex dimensionality of health status that produces considerable heterogeneity in 
health outcomes, the two-way interaction between health and economic status, and the separation 
of anticipated from unanticipated health or economic shocks. 
The emphasis in health research has been on understanding and disentangling the 
multiple ways in which socio-economic status may influence a variety of health outcomes.  
Consequently, much less is currently known about the impact health may have on SES.  But at 
least for working-aged individuals, health feedbacks to labor supply, household income, and 
wealth may be quantitatively quite important.  Therefore, one aim of this paper will be to 
estimate the effect of new health events on a series of subsequent outcomes that are both directly 
and indirectly related to SES.  These outcomes will include out-of-pocket medical expenses, the 
intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, health insurance, and household income.  
Finding evidence that there are significant feedbacks from new health events to these 
subsequent correlates of SES does not negate the real possibility that the probability of 
experiencing the onset of a minor or major new health event may not be uniform across several 
SES dimensions.  This pathway is also explored here by examining whether the onset of new   2
chronic conditions is related to household income, wealth, and education once one conditions for 
a set of pre-existing set of demographic and health conditions. 
This research will use multiple waves of data on health status and transitions, medical 
expenses, labor supply, income, and wealth accumulation from the first five waves of the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS).  HRS is a national sample of about 7,600 households (12,654 
individuals) with at least one person in the household 51-61 years old originally interviewed in 
the fall of 1992 and winter of 1993.  The principal objective of HRS is to monitor economic 
transitions in work, income, and wealth, as well as changes in many dimensions of health status. 
The first follow-up of HRS respondents was fielded approximately two years after the baseline. 
HRS instruments span the spectrum of behaviors of interest:  on the economic side, work, 
income and wealth; on the functional side, health and functional status, disability, and medical 
expenditures. 
  The paper is divided into three sections.  The first documents the considerable amount on 
new health activity that afflicts individuals during their fifties and early sixties.  The second 
section analyses the impact of these new health events on a series of outcomes—medical 
expenses, work effort, income, and health insurance.  In the third section, this perspective is 
reversed by examining which dimensions of SES—income, wealth, and education—are able to 
predict future health outcomes.  
Section 1.  The Best of Times and the Worst of Times 
 
  Matters are pretty quiet for most people on the economic front when they are in their 
fifties.  For better or worse, what one does for a living has long since been settled and salary 
adjustments stick pretty closely to CPI swings.  But it is anything but quiet and settled on the 
health front.  Table 1 documents the extent of this activity by listing in the first column   3
prevalence rates of major and minor chronic conditions for respondents who were members of 
the original HRS cohort (those born between 1931 and 1941).  Major conditions were defined as 
cancer, heart condition, stroke, and diseases of the lung.  All other onsets are defined as minor.  
At baseline in 1992, 39% of HRS respondents claimed to have no chronic conditions at all while 
43% reported that they had had some minor onset sometime in the past.  About one in five stated 
that they already had experienced a major condition onset.
1   
  The extent of the new health problems reported during these eight years is impressive if 
not depressing.  Independent of their baseline status, about half of all respondents experienced 
some type of onset during the first five HRS waves.  Note that the conditional probability of a 
major onset is much higher if one had already reported some type of health problem at HRS 
baseline than if one was chronic condition free.  To illustrate, the probability of experiencing a 
major onset sometime after HRS started is 53% higher if one had a minor condition at baseline 
instead of having no chronic condition at all.  This no doubt reflects the progressive nature of 
disease whereby having relatively minor medical problem (such as hypertension) heightens the 
odds of experiencing another much more severe one (such as a heart attack).   
The final column in Table 1 looks back and summarizes the consequences of all this 
activity by listing prevalence rates at the end of the 5
th round of HRS.  By this time, more than 
four out of every five HRS respondents had experienced an onset of some chronic condition, and 
for a third of them the onset was one that I label major.  In less than a decade, the fraction of 
respondents without any health condition was cut in half while the proportion with a severe 
health problem doubled. 
                                                 
1 In this and all other tables in this paper, major trumps minor.  That is, an individual who reports both a minor and 
major onset is included in the major category.   4
While certainly a real concern for the families involved, the sheer extent of this new and 
largely negative health activity raises several analytical questions and opportunities for research.  
The most direct question involves what the financial consequences of this health deterioration 
might be, an issue I address in the next section.  The analytical opportunities stem from the 
considerable variation in individual health status during these ages, especially compared to that 
observed in the standard mainstays of life-cycle models.  
Section 2.  The Consequences of New Health Events 
It is useful to first outline the essential issues in estimating effects of SES on health as 
well as the effects of health on SES.  Current realizations of both economic status and health 
reflect a dynamic history in which both health (Ht) and SES (Yt) are mutually affected by each 
other as well as by other relevant forces.  Most of the relevant ideas can be summarized by the 
following two equations:  
(1)  Ht = α0 + α1Ht-1 + α2Yt-1 + α3 ∆Yt+ α4 Xt-1+ u1t 
(2) Yt = β0 + β1 Ht-1 + β2Yt-1 + β3∆Ht + β4Xt-1 + u2t 
where Xt-1 represents a vector of other possibly non-overlapping time and non-time varying 
factors influencing health and SES and u1t  and u2t are possibly correlated stochastic shocks to 
health and SES.  The key parameters α3 and β3 measure the effects of new innovations of SES on 
health, and health on SES respectively.  In this framework, we can also estimate whether past 
values of SES predict health (α2≠ 0) or past values of health predict SES (β3≠ 0).
2  
To estimate the “effect” of either on the other (α3 and β3), we require exogenous variation 
in health (or SES) that is not induced by SES (health).  In an earlier paper (Smith 1999), I 
                                                 
2 For an insightful debate about the conditions under whether coefficients are zero or stationary also reveals 
something about causality, see the paper by Adams et al. (2003) and the comments on that paper in the same 
volume.   5
proposed one research strategy for isolating new health events—the onset of new chronic 
conditions.  While to some extent people may anticipate onset, much of the actual realization and 
especially its timing may be unanticipated.  While new onsets may provide the best chance of 
isolating health shocks, not all new onset is a surprise.  A set of behavioral risk factors and prior 
health or economic conditions may make some people more susceptible than others to this risk.  
Thus, predictors of new onsets should be included in models to increase one’s confidence that 
the remaining statistical variation in new onsets is “news.”  Similarly, to estimate α3 we require 
variation in SES not induced by health and my approach to this issue will be outlined in the next 
section. In this section, I present my results for equation 2 above- the effect of health on SES- 
and in the section that follows I discuss my results relevant to equation 1. 
One thing that may happen when people become newly sick is that their medical 
expenses may rise, and the extent to which they rise may be influenced by the continued 
presence of health insurance.  But medical expenses are by no means the only way health shocks 
can affect wealth accumulation.  Most directly, healthier people may work longer hours in any 
given week and more weeks during a year, both of which may lead to higher earnings.  To 
estimate the impact of the onset of new health conditions, a parallel set of models is estimated 
predicting out-of-pocket medical expenses, the continued possession of health insurance, labor 
supply, household income, and wealth or savings.  
A new health event in one year may affect medical expenditure, labor supply and income 
not only in the year in which the event occurred but in future years as well.  For example, at one 
extreme, the onset of a new condition may induce only single period changes in labor supply 
after which labor supply may stabilize.  But it is possible that spillover effects of a health shock 
may further depress work effort in future years or alternatively some recovery to original levels   6
may take place.  One way of estimating such patterns is to estimate a series of four equations for 








∆= α+ β ∆ ∑  
 
where Lt is the between-wave change in labor supply and Ht the within-period health event from 
period t to t-1.  Similar equations would apply for household income, out-of-pocket medical 
expenses, and other outcomes.  If there are only contemporaneous one period effects of health 
events, all lagged values of Ht will be zero.
3  
  X represents a vector of baseline HRS attributes that include baseline measures of birth 
cohort (or age), marital status, race, ethnicity, education, region of residence, quintiles of family 
income, and a vector of measures of baseline health.  These health measures include dummies 
for four of the five categories of self-reported health status, the presence of each chronic 
condition, a set of behavioral risk factors (smoking, exercise, BMI, drinking), and a scaled index 
of functional limitations based on the answers to the ADL questions.  Given these extensive set 
of baseline health controls, the new onset of chronic conditions in each wave captures the impact 
of a new health event that is not predicted by (observed) baseline health and to that extent may 
be labeled news.  
While this formulation has been simplified into a single type of new health event ( Ht-i), 
different kinds of health changes may have quite different economic consequences (Smith 1999).  
Health events can be distinguished by their severity, immediacy, impact on functioning, and 
duration.  For example, the onset of hypertension may have no immediate consequences, but it 
                                                 
3 All models in this paper are restricted to survivors—those who neither attrited nor died across the waves—so this 
analysis ignores the relationship of SES with attrition and mortality.  Given the age range of HRS respondents, 
mortality selection but not attrition is unlikely to be that critical.  That is clearly not the case in the AHEAD sample. 
For a model that incorporates mortality selection see Adams et al. (2003).     7
may signal a more difficult future.  In contrast, a heart attack or stroke has devastating immediate 
and future effects on medical expenditures and work effort.  At this point in the research effort, I 
have made only one simple distinction—whether the health event is classified as severe or 
minor.  Further distinctions will be pursued in the future and will largely be an issue of how 
much data are required. 
 
Medical Expenses and Health Insurance 
  One quite direct financial impact of a health onset may be the additional medical costs 
that are incurred.  While some combination of private and public health insurance will pay the 
bulk of these costs, insurance does not cover all of them.  Some people may lack health 
insurance, and even for those who have it not all medical costs are covered either due to caps or 
exclusion of certain benefits such as drugs.  Table 2 presents the distribution of total out-of-
pocket medical expenses associated with an onset of a new health condition that took place 
between the baseline and second wave of HRS.  That onset could have been either a major or 
minor one and separate OOP expense distributions are presented for each situation.  These 
medical costs are measured over the first five waves of HRS and thus are cumulative across eight 
years.  The reference group in Table 2 is those HRS respondents who had no medical onset at all 
across the first five survey waves. 
  The incremental mean medical expenses associated with a severe health onset are about 
$5,500 and only about $1,600 if the onset was one I label mild.  Given that the time period spans 
eight years, these are modest sums.  However, not all appears modest and there may be 
considerable financial risks associated with new medical problems.  For example, after 
experiencing a severe onset there is a 10% chance that OOP medical expenses over the next year 
will increase by $17,000, a one-in-twenty chance that they will increase by about $25,000, and a   8
one-in-fifty shot of an increment of more than $40,000.  However, these financial risks of 
additional medical expenses are mostly associated with severe onsets.  If the onset was one 
within the mild category, the mean impact of $1,600 is a reasonably good descriptor of shift in 
the entire OOP cost distribution.  For example, compared to a mean estimate of  $1,600, there is 
a one-in-twenty chance of a $2,800 increase in OOP medical expenses when the new onset was 
mild. 
  The cost data contained in Table 2 describe the cumulative impact of a new onset.  To 
describe year-by-year flows, Table 3 presents estimates of the mean increase in OOP expenses 
due to the period-by-period onset of new medical conditions.  As described above, these 
estimates are based on models that control for pre-existing health conditions, economic status, 
and a standard set of demographics.  Four sets of models are estimated—one each for the amount 
of OOP medical expenses that took place between successive waves.  Each model includes as 
covariates all prior wave health shocks.  The rows in Table 3 represent the wave at which HRS 
OOP medical costs are measured, and the columns the time of onset of new health condition.  
The final row sums these period costs to compute the cumulative (up to wave 5) increase in OOP 
medical costs associated with each medical event. 
Thus, a severe health shock that occurred between waves 1 and 2 of HRS initially 
increased mean OOP medical expenses by $1,720 during the two-year interval when it happened. 
This same health event also produced future increases in health costs that were of progressively 
smaller amounts.  By the fifth wave, the mean total cost was a little over $4,000 so that less than 
half of the incremental costs were borne around the time of the event.  Roughly speaking, the 
same pattern exists for major health events taking place in other HRS waves—an initial mean 
impact of about $2,000 followed by additional albeit falling cost increments in future years.   9
These estimated increases in total OOP medical costs in Table 3 are not all that different than the 
simple unadjusted differences displayed in Table 2 suggesting that these additional costs are due 
to the actual onset and not the result of other (measurable) differences at baseline between those 
who actually experienced a major health event and those who did not. 
  The primary purpose of health insurance is to reduce this financial risk.  The second and 
third panels of Table 2 present the same type of data on the distribution of OOP medical 
expenses, but this time stratified by whether or not the respondent had health insurance at 
baseline.  Health insurance certainly dampens but does not eliminate medical costs due to new 
major illness.  The mean increase in OOP medical costs is around $5,000 among those with 
health insurance and about twice that amount for those without health insurance.  A comparison 
of the impact of a severe health event by insurance coverage shows that expenditures are actually 
lower at and below the median respondent without health insurance, but that they become 
progressively greater for the uninsured in the right tail of the cost distribution.  This suggests that 
there is an impact of insurance on utilization as well as on expenditures.  The lower impact of a 
severe onset below the median for those without health insurance may indicate that those without 
insurance went without some care costing moderate amounts.  But some of the large expenses 
appear to have been borne by those without health insurance. 
The financial risks of health events remain for all HRS respondents.  Even for those with 
health insurance at baseline, there is a one-in-twenty chance of an increase in expenses of about 
$11,000 and a one-in-fifty of about $23,000 additional outlays.  Of course, the situation is far 
more difficult among those without baseline health insurance where even the mean effect of a 
new severe onset is about $10,000.  For them, there is a 10% chance of $28,000 more in OOP 
medical costs, and a 5% chance of an extra $73,000 in additional expenses.  In contrast, the shift   10
in expense distribution induced by a minor onset is not large whether or not the respondent was 
covered by health insurance.  
  The data in Table 2 control for the presence of health insurance at baseline.  One fear 
associated with becoming sick is the possibility of losing health insurance, especially if one can 
no longer work.  For those without health insurance, the concern is that it may now be almost 
impossible to obtain it.  Table 4 addresses this issue by listing the fraction of HRS respondents 
who reported no type of health insurance in each wave.  As they age into government programs 
like Medicare, even among those who experienced no new health events across the first five 
waves the percent without health insurance fell in half (from 14% to 7%).  Table 4 also lists the 
same data for respondents who experienced a new major health event between each wave.  The 
timing of the new health event is indicated by the placement of the dotted lines in each column. 
While each of the last four columns shows the same downward trend in non-coverage, in each 
case there is a noticeable jump at the time the major health event occurred.
4  
  Table 5 provides a more detailed look at what is happening by listing the types of health 
insurance held at each wave.  At baseline, among those HRS respondent with health insurance 
the dominant mode by far is employer-provided insurance, but as the waves unfold and 
retirement comes closer there is a gradual transition toward more government provided 
insurance.  But with what looks like a one period lag, this transition is clearly accelerated by a 
new major event.  For example, between the second and fourth waves of data, there is a 25 
percentage point drop in employer-only coverage and a 20 percentage point increase in 
government-only coverage.  This compares to only a 10 percentage point drop in employer and 
12 percentage point increase in government coverage for those experiencing no new health 
events.  The data in Appendix Table A demonstrates that virtually all of this expansion in 
                                                 
4 There were no such breaks for new minor health events.    11
government-provided health insurance was Medicare and not either Medicaid or Champus—the 
two other major government programs. 
  Instead of new major health events raising the prospects of a loss of health insurance they 
actually triggered new (earlier) eligibility and lead to an expansion in insurance.  This indicates 
that in terms of the consequences of health events the pre-retirement years represented by the 
original HRS cohort might be quite unique and should not be extrapolated to younger people.  
Work and Income 
  New health events can impact the financial well being of households in other ways as 
well.  Perhaps, the most direct is that declining health may make work more difficult.  Following 
the same format used in Table 3, Tables 6, 7, and 8 summarize the estimated effects of new 
health shocks on changes in the probability of work, changes in the number of hours worked per 
week (conditional on working), and changes in household income.   
Similar to the time pattern of effects documented earlier for OOP medical expenses, a 
new severe health onset has an immediate and large impact of reducing the probability of 
working, which is then followed by diminishing ripple like effects in subsequent waves.   To 
illustrate, a severe health event between the first and second wave of HRS reduced the 
probability of work by 15 percentage points between the same two waves.  Since the average 
labor force participation rate at baseline among those who were about to experience this major 
health event was .55, the impact on work is decidedly not trivial.  Once again, estimated 
incremental effects in subsequent years cascade downward so that by the end of HRS wave 5, the 
probability of work had declined by about 27 percentage points due to a major health shock 
between waves 1 and 2.  This pattern of a large immediate reduction in the probability of work 
followed by smaller additional declines in future waves also characterizes major health events   12
that took place between the other waves of HRS.  There appears to be a small decline in the 
absolute size of the impact on work effort, which would not be surprising as labor force 
participation is trending down as HRS respondents age.  Just as was reported for medical costs, 
estimated effects are considerably smaller if the health events come under the minor label. 
In contrast to these quite dramatic impacts on the probability of work, the estimated 
effects on my measure of the intensive work margin—weekly hours conditional on work shown 
in Table 7—are not only more modest in their immediate impact, but the contemporaneous 
effects are about the same as the cumulative effects indicating little spillover to future years. 
Apparently the principal way that work is altered by a new severe health event is through the 
extensive margin of whether one works or not. 
  Table 8 provides estimates of the biannual changes in annual household income that are 
associated with new health events.  While labor force activity refers to the same time as the 
survey, it is important to remember that household income is for the previous year so that some 
part of total income receipts actually predates the onset of the disease.  In addition to between-
wave household income changes presented in the first four rows of this table, the final two rows 
provide two summary measures of cumulative change over the first five waves.  The first—total 
yearly income loss—was obtained from summing the column estimates and thus measures the 
difference in household income between wave 5 and the wave preceding the new health event.  
The second—cumulative income loss—measures the total loss in household income associated 
with the health event.  
Not surprisingly given the labor force results described above, new health events reduce 
household income with the reduction larger when the shock is major.  There is no evidence of 
any household income recovery in subsequent years so that the initial income losses persist.  In   13
fact, consistent with the labor force participation effects, there are additional diminishing income 
losses in subsequent waves. These period-by-period income losses while cumulatively 
significant are much smaller than the reductions in work force participation contained in Table 6.  
Off their baseline levels, household income declines are in the order of 10% or less compared to 
close to 30% for workforce participation.  The reasons for this discrepancy in the two related 
outcomes do not lie so much in offsets in other types of income (for example I find little 
evidence of additional work effort of spouses) but instead in different reactions to similar health 
shocks across the income distribution.  Low-income households are much more likely to react to 
a health shock by exiting the labor force than are higher-income households. 
The final row in Table 8 presents the cumulative household incomes loss associated with 
the health event.
5  Evaluated using mean effects, cumulative household income losses are much 
larger than the cumulative increases in OOP medical expenses described above in Table 3.  For 
example, for the wave 1-2 major health shock, the order of magnitude is ten to one.  While less 
dramatic for the severe health shocks in the other waves, cumulative income losses typically 
exceed cumulative medical expenses by a large single-digit integer.  
Table 9 contains my estimates of the sum of cumulative income loss plus cumulative 
medical expenses associated with the onset of a health event derived from these models.  The 
lifetime budget constraint linking consumption, income, assets, and savings implies that this sum 
of income loss plus cumulative medical expenses (plus the foregone interest on them) represents 
an alternative way of measuring the wealth change or savings that took place across the first five 
waves of HRS.  
                                                 
5 I assume that the health event took place midway between the waves so the income loss coincident with the health 
event applies initially for only one year.   14
There are several advantages and disadvantages with this alternative measure of the 
household savings.  Since income is arguably measured with much greater accuracy than 
household wealth, this alternative concept should be less contaminated by measurement error 
than changes in household wealth are known to be.  Second, this alternative measure is also less 
affected by capital gains, which during the periods of the recent stock market boom and bust may 
well dominate changes in household wealth over time.  The principal disadvantage is that this 
alternative measure does not incorporate changes in other components of household consumption 
besides medical expenses.  Invoking standard consumption smoothing arguments may not be a 
sufficient safe harbor as standard inter-temporal theory suggests that consumption adjustments 
may be triggered in part by new health events. 
With these caveats, the data in Table 9 indicate that the onset of all major health events 
should have lead to a reduction in household wealth with that reduction much larger for major 
health events compared to the more minor ones.  Table 9 also includes the same summary 
measures of household income loss and cumulative medical expenses that were obtained from 
precisely the same models estimated using the original AHEAD sample.  Given the 
predominance of retirement and virtually universal coverage by Medicare in the AHEAD 
sample, not surprisingly the implied change in household wealth triggered by a new health event 
whether it is major or minor is considerably smaller in the AHEAD sample.  In the AHEAD 
sample, there is much less possibility of any income loss since most respondents’ income is 
either annutized or is not contingent contemporaneously on changes in health status (see Smith 
and Kington (1997) for additional evidence). 
Table 10 lists results of models that use two alternative measures of changes in household 
wealth—the cumulative income loss and OOP medical expenses plus the implicit foregone   15
interest on them (labeled the cumulative model) and the more direct measure using the change in 
household wealth between the first and fifth wave of HRS—as the outcome variables.  In this 
formulation, negative coefficients in cumulative model imply positive household wealth growth 
so that the coefficients in the two alternative models should have opposite signs.  In most cases, 
this turns out to be the case and estimated coefficients are often remarkably close especially as 
there is nothing at the measurement level tying these two outcomes together.  
The principal difference between the two models lies in fact in the final row—the R
2—
that are more than eight times larger in the cumulative model. 
  The negative consequences of the 
considerably greater measurement error in household wealth are apparent from the much larger 
standard errors, lower statistical significance, and somewhat wilder fluctuation in estimated 
coefficients (when one would think they might be ordered as in baseline self-reported GHS) in 
the household wealth model compared to the cumulative model. 
At least if only signs are used as the criteria, there are many similarities in the estimates 
obtained with the two alternative outcome measures.  Since these similarities are not forced 
through measurement, this may encourage at least some of us to assign more credibility to some 
of the results.  For example, both outcome specifications predict that younger HRS respondents 
experienced greater wealth growth over these eight years and that wealth growth was somewhat 
smaller among women, African-Americans, and Latinos.  Finally, additional years of 
schooling—and most particularly having a college degree—are associated with larger amounts 
of wealth accumulation under either definition of the outcome.  
The major exception to this theme of overall similarity concerns the household income 
and wealth variables, which have the same signs in both models in the first and third columns of 
Table 10.  Since additional financial resources should promote savings, the a priori expectation   16
is that the baseline financial variables should be negative in the cumulative model and positive in 
the wealth change specification.  But this is only the case for wealth in the model where income 
is included in the outcome (the cumulative model) and household income in the wealth change 
model.  The reason for this confusion stems from the impact of measurement error in both 
income and wealth, which when appearing on both sides of the estimated equation seriously 
biases the estimated coefficients.  The second and fourth columns omit the guilty party from the 
respective models, and much more sensible estimates are now obtained for the effect of wealth in 
the cumulative model and the effect of income in the wealth change model.  Both estimates now 
imply reasonable ranges of the marginal propensity to save.  By and large the estimated effects 
of other variables in the model are not sensitive to these alternative specifications. 
My principal interest in these models concerns the impact of a new health event.  I 
concentrate only on the impact of new health events between waves 1 and 2.  In the cumulative 
model, the estimates of household savings induced by the major and minor health onset are close 
to those obtained by summing the individual wave estimates that were summarized in Table 9—a 
major health onset lead to a cumulative loss of about $52,000 and a minor one a cumulative loss 
of about $11,000.  Both minor and major health onsets also lead to a cumulative wealth lost 
when wealth change models are examined.  However, estimates now are not terribly precise—a 
predictable consequence of poorly-measured household wealth in the HRS panel. 
I also examined whether or not there were important interaction effects of a new health 
onset by interacting the two health event onset variables with race, gender, ethnicity, education, 
income, and wealth.  None of these interactions were significant except wealth in the cumulative 
model and baseline household income in the wealth change model.  In both cases, the effects of a 
major health onset were larger the higher baseline wealth or income.  For example, the impact of   17
a major health event in reducing wealth growth was larger the higher initial levels of household 
income.  This finding is consistent with a combination of consumption smoothing and liquidity 
constraints.  Lower-income households are forced to absorb more of the wealth change in 
consumption.  
Section 3.  Predictors of New Health Events 
  In this section, I reverse the question by examining the ability of baseline SES measures 
to predict the future onset of disease once one controls for measures of baseline health.  I also 
explore the extent to which innovations in economic status ‘cause’ changes in health. 
Table 11 contains the results obtained from probit models predicting the onset of a major 
or a minor chronic condition between waves 1 and waves 5 of HRS.  These models include as 
covariates a vector of baseline health conditions of the respondent—self-reported general health 
status (excellent, very good, good, with fair and poor the excluded class), the presence of a 
chronic condition at baseline, a scale measuring the extent of functional limitations (from 0 to 
100 with higher numbers indicating poorer functioning).  The models also include a standard set 
of behavioral risk factors (currently a smoker, number of cigarettes smoked), whether one 
engaged in vigorous exercise, and BMI (entered as quadratic), and a relatively standard set of 
demographic controls—birth cohort (born between 1935-1937, after 1937 with pre 1935 or the 
older respondents the excluded group), race (1= African-American), Hispanic ethnicity, and sex 
(1= women), and region of residence.  My main interest lies in the SES measures that include 
household income, household wealth, and respondent’s education (two dummies—12-15 years 
of schooling, 16 or more years, with less than 12 the excluded group). 
Just as one needed innovations in health that were not caused by SES to estimate the 
impact of health on SES, it is also necessary to isolate innovations in SES that were not caused   18
by health to estimate the impact of SES on health.  One opportunity for doing so lies in the large 
wealth increases that were accumulated during the large stock market run-up during the 1990s.  
Given the unusually large run-up in the stock market during these decades, it is reasonable to 
posit that a good deal of this surge was unanticipated and thus captures unanticipated exogenous 
wealth increases that were not caused by a person’s health.  If financial measures of SES do 
improve health, such increases in stock market wealth should be associated with better 
subsequent health outcomes at least with a lag.
6  
Putting aside for a moment the central SES results, most of the estimates listed in 
Table 11 are as expected.  Older respondents are much more likely to experience a new chronic 
onset, and the likelihood of experiencing a new onset is strongly negatively related to better 
health status as measured at baseline.  There are some suggestions of some to-do’s and not-to-
do’s from the health behavioral risk variables.  Even after controlling for an extensive list of 
baseline health conditions, smoking, excessive drinking, and the absence of vigorous exercise 
places one at elevated risk for the onset of a new major condition but appears to have little 
impact on the minor onsets.  Women, Latinos and perhaps somewhat surprisingly African-
Americans are all of lower risk of a major new onset while only African-Americans face a 
statistically significant higher risk of a new minor onset. 
My principal interest in these models is whether prior wave SES predicts the likelihood 
of new illnesses, and if so which measures of SES, and if so why?  A pretty consistent 
generalization can be made for household income—it never predicts future onset on minor or 
major conditions.  While household wealth appears to be only related to a major onset, this effect 
is not particularly large and as we shall see below it will mostly disappear with a single 
                                                 
6 One limitation of using increases is stock market wealth is that these increases are concentrated at the top of the 
income distribution (see Smith (2000)).  Obtaining other credible measures of exogenous changes in financial 
resources that more evenly span the entire income distribution would be very useful.   19
exception when I break out the different types of chronic onset.  Finally, my best measure of an 
exogenous wealth change—the wealth increase from the stock market—is only statistically 
significant in one instance (arthritis) and there it has the incorrect sign so that an increase in 
stock market wealth makes the onset of arthritis more likely.  Moreover, in results I do not 
display in Table 11, having health insurance also does not predict future onset.  In sum then, SES 
variables that directly measure or proxy for financial resources of a family are either not related 
or at best only weakly related to the future onset of disease over the time span of eight years.   
This largely negative conclusion is in sharp contrast to the results obtained for the final 
SES measure—education and for the gist of the results reported by Adams et al. (2003) for a 
mostly retired population.  Additional schooling is strongly and statistically significantly 
predictive of the new onset of both major as well as minor disease over the first eight waves of 
the HRS.  
To obtain some notion of why all this may be so, Table 12 lists estimated coefficients for 
the SES variables obtained with models for each of the chronic conditions separately.  In no 
single case is the estimated coefficient on household income (which vacillates in sign) 
statistically significant.  While the coefficients on wealth lean towards negative values, in only 
one case (stroke) is a statistically significant result negative result obtained for household wealth.  
Combined these results in Table 12 strengthen the overall conclusion that in a sample of the pre-
retirees financial measures of SES do not appear to be able to predict future onset of disease 
across a time horizon of almost a decade. 
Once again, however, in all cases except cancer (which looks very much like an equal 
opportunity disease), the effects of schooling are preventative against disease onset.  But here too   20
disease differentiate may eventually be informative as the most powerful protection of education 
takes place for arthritis and diseases of the lung with diabetes and heart disease in the next tier.   
That leaves us with the most difficult question of all—why does education matter so 
much?  To try to provide at least some partial insight into this question, I ran an expanded 
version of these models.  This expansion involved including some of the more likely prospects 
that are measured in the HRS—cognition, past health behaviors, early life health and economic 
environments, parental attributes and parental health.  HRS information on some of these 
concepts is quite limited but it does record whether one smoked in the past and whether one was 
exposed on the job to a health hazard (and the number of years of exposure), the education of 
parents, whether or not each parent is alive, and if deceased the age of death, self-accessed 
general health status as a child (the same five point scale), and an assessment of the economic 
environment in which one lived during childhood.
7  The results obtained from this expanded 
model are presented in Table 13 (for major onsets) and Table 14 (for minor offsets). 
First, lets deal with the easier question—which of these new measures did not seem to 
matter in this context.  Two of the more prominent cognition variables available in the HRS were 
added to these models—memory word count and the Wechsher scale (a measure of higher order 
reasoning).  Neither of these cognition variables was statistically significant and their inclusion 
had no impact at all on the education variables.  The same conclusion would apply to the ex-
smoker variable, the environmental job exposure variable, and parental education.
8 
                                                 
7 The specific question for health was “Consider your health while you were growing up, from birth to age 16.   
Would you say that your health during that time was excellent, very good,  good, fair, or poor?”  The specific 
question for economic circumstances was “Now think about your family when you were growing up, from birth to 
age 16.  Would you say your family during that time was pretty well off financially, about average, or poor?” 
8 When individual chronic conditions were examined separately, the environmental exposure variable has a 
statistically positive effect on diseases of the lung.   21
What did matter was the self-evaluation of childhood health and economic status and 
parental health as proxied by age of death of each parent.
9  For the major health onsets, a 
(currently) self-assessed better health status and better economic status during childhood both 
reduce the risk of incurring a serious health onset in one’s fifties and early sixties even after 
controlling for current health and economic status.  There is, of course, ample support for such a 
finding in the work of Barker (1997) and others who have emphasized the delayed health impact 
of early childhood exposures.  I would currently view these results more cautiously until the 
disease specific relevance can be rationalized.  For example, when models are estimated on the 
individual diseases separately, the principal impacts of childhood health appear in heart disease 
and diseases of the lung (and not cancer).  More puzzling, the major impact of childhood 
economic circumstances appears in cancer for which a convincing explanation does not 
immediately jump to mind. 
In the minor onset specification in Table 14, what principally matters are the measures of 
parental health.  Having a living parent or having a parent being older when they died tend to 
reduce the likelihood of an onset on new chronic conditions.  When these are estimated on a 
disease specific basis, the effects are concentrated in hypertension and diabetes and pretty much 
non-existent in arthritis.  The same caveats mentioned above for the major onsets would apply 
here as well. 
With these additional variables included, the effects of own education in predicting 
onsets appears to be diminished but the principal impact may have been more on standard errors 
                                                 
9 For evidence of the role of economic resources during childhood, see Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson (2002) and 
Wadsworth and Kuh (1997).   22
than on point estimates.  My admittedly tentative conclusion would be that collectively these 
additional factors explain some but not all of the ability of education to predict future onset.
10 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I examined several questions related to the SES health gradient using a 
sample of people first observed when they were mostly between ages 51 and 61.  This research 
was based on extensive data about baseline health and several dimensions of their SES as well 
and the update on this information available from four subsequent follow-ups taking place at 
two-year intervals.  Innovations in health are proxied by the new onset of chronic conditions, a 
relatively common event in this age group, and innovations in economic status by the change in 
stock market wealth over this period. 
There are some things that appear clear.  Among people in their pre-retirement years, 
feedbacks from health to labor supply, household income, and wealth are realities that should 
neither be ignored nor dismissed as of secondary importance. Working is the critical link in this 
chain with OOP medical expenses, while not ignorable especially for distributional analysis, in 
the second tier.  These negative income and wealth consequences of new health innovations do 
appear to decay with age and are certainly much smaller in an already retired population.  What 
these consequences would be 10 or 20 years earlier in age is an important and yet unanswered 
question (see Smith (2003).  The evidence is this paper along with that available in other studies 
(Adams et al. (2003), Smith (1999)) means that we can say with more confidence that health has 
quantitatively strong consequences for several dimensions of SES, particularly financial ones in 
certain age groups. 
                                                 
10 For an alternative explanation of the role of disease self-management in the health education gradient, see 
Goldman and Smith (2002).    23
  More tentative conclusions are warranted for the ability of SES measures to predict future 
onset of disease.  Perhaps, most importantly, my evidence does suggest that the role of financial 
measures of SES—household income, household wealth, or health insurance—is quite weak.  To 
put it most simply, household income never appears to predict any future onset over the horizon 
of about a decade and there is only weak evidence that levels of changes in household wealth 
helps much at all.  However, it is not true that SES doesn’t matter.  Even after controlling for an 
extensive list of baseline health conditions and status, education still strongly predicts the future 
onset of disease.   
  My attempts to explain why education may matter represent the most tentative part of my 
thinking.  There is evidence that the pathways may well be disease specific as the predictive 
power of schooling varies considerably by disease.  There is also some evidence that legacy 
effects from childhood may still matter 30 or 40 years later even when the health outcome is the 
onset of new disease.  Whether or not these legacy effects represent economic, health, or genetic 
factors is quite uncertain in my view and requires much more additional research.   24
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Table 1 
Pre-existing and New Health Conditions—Original HRS Cohort 
 
Pre-Prevalence   Cond. Incidence Incidence  Post-Prevalence 
    
 38.7  NONE    49.9  18.5 
   None  47.8 
   Minor  36.4 
   Major  15.5 
 
 
 42.6  MINOR    28.9  45.5 
   None  51.6 
   Minor  22.1 
   Major  26.5 
 
 18.7  MAJOR      21.4  36.0 
   None  50.3 
   Minor  28.9 
   Major  21.9 
  Source:  Calculations by author from first five waves of HRS—sample born between 1931-1941.  All 
data are weighted. 
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Table 2 










Wave 2 incidence of chronic condition 
severe  1,007 3,430  6,660  11,011 29,925 43,365 72,266  11,285 
mild  532 2,155  3,187 6,751 15,729 21,199 31,178  7,299 
none  all  five  waves  414 1,579  3,164 5,668 12,463 18,356 30,904  5,776 
 
Have health insurance at baseline 
severe  1,130 3,868  6,672  10,624 25,111 32,382 53,432  10,609 
mild  627 2,265  3,908 6,979 15,748 21,199 35,312  7,570 
none  all  five  waves  496 1,633  3,235 5,688 12,170 17,584 30,811  5,738 
 
Have no health insurance at baseline 
severe.  73 1,196  4,867  15,291 43,485 93,982 93,982  16,444 
mild  184 1,247  3,094 5,490 15,008 21,729 30,131  5,674 
none all five waves  153  1,138  2,787  5,773  14,958   20,692   39,489  6,168 
  Calculations by author using HRS—between Waves 1-5.  All data are weighted. 
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Table 3 
Impact of New Health Shock on Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses 
Major Health Shock Between  
 
Wave W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 2  1,720* 
 
 3  1,037*  2,052* 
 
 4  893*  734*  1,490* 
 
 5  503*    401  607*  1,969* 
 
Total   4,153   3,187  2,097   1,969 
Minor Health Shock Between 
 
Wave W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 
 2  175 
 
 3  313  766*   
 
 4  160    247  443* 
 
 5  567*  682*  625*  456* 
 
Total  1,215   1,695   1,065  456 
  *Statistically significant at 5%.  
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Table 4 
Fraction of Respondents Without Health Insurance 
 
  Major Health Onset by: 
 No  Health 
Onsets 
Wave 1-2  Wave 2-3  Wave 3-4  Wave 4-5 
Wave  1    14.0   13.6   14.4   15.1  16.0 
Wave  2    12.4  8.0   14.2   12.1    15.6 
Wave  3    10.3  6.1  7.8   10.2    13.8 
Wave  4    9.4  6.6  7.6  6.0   9.2 
Wave  5    7.3  2.6  4.9  3.6   6.5 
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Table 5 
Changes in Type of Health Insurance 
 
No New Health Event  1  2  3  4  5 
No health insurance  12.2  10.8  9.1  8.4  6.1 
Employer  only  62.8 62.8  60.1  52.0 41.9 
Government  only  5.2 7.5  13.0 19.4  25.9 
Government and employer  4.9  6.6  8.0  11.2  16.1 
Personal  only  5.9 6.4  9.2  7.3 6.5 
All  other  9.0 5.0  0.6  1.7 3.5 
 
Severe Health Event, Wave 1 - 2  1  2  3  4  5 
No health insurance  11.9  6.3  5.1  4.9  1.6 
Employer  only  58.6 57.8  44.8  34.4 23.7 
Government  only  10.3 16.1  26.0  35.6 41.9 
Government and employer  5.1  9.1  16.8  20.7  23.7 
Personal  only  4.5 3.9  7.4  4.0 1.6 
All  other  9.6 6.8  0.1  0.4 7.5 
 
 
Minor Health Event, Wave 1 - 2  1  2  3  4  5 
No health insurance  15.4  13.0  9.9  7.2  5.5 
Employer  only  59.0 60.5  56.3  47.5 36.0 
Government  only  6.0 9.7  17.6 23.6  29.1 
Government and employer  4.3  5.9  8.3  14.3  21.1 
Personal  only  6.9 5.1  7.4  6.4 5.6 
All  other  8.4 5.8  0.5  1.0 2.7 
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Table 6 
Probability of Working 
Major Health Shock 
 
   W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 2  -.148* 
 
 3  -.054  -.156* 
 
 4  -.030  -.024  -.091* 
 
 5  -.036  -045  -049  -.112* 
 
Total -.268  -.225  -.140  -.112 
Minor Health Shock 
 
 W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 2  -.041* 
 
 3  -.036*  -.031   
 
 4  -.017  -.022  -.019 
 
 5  -.013  -.004  -.021  -.015 
 
Total -.107  -.057  -.040  -.015   31
Table 7 
Hours Worked Per Week 
 
Major Health Shock 
 
   W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 2  -4.02* 
 
 3  0.64  -4.31* 
 
 4  -0.60  0.63  -1.96* 
 
 5  0.17  0.16  -0.68  -2.54* 
 
Total -3.83  -3.50  -2.64  -2.54 
 
Minor Health Shock 
 
 W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 2  -1.21* 
 
 3  -0.99  -1.51*   
 
 4  0.40  -0.17  -1.54* 
 
 5  0.30  0.12  0.15  0.07 
 
Total -1.49  -1.56  -1.39  0.07 
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Table 8 
Impact of Health Shock on Household Income 
 
Major Health Shock 
 
   W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 
  2    -4,033* 
 
 3  -1,258  -737 
 
  4  -698 -3,231 -2,239 
 
  5  -269 -460 -139  -3,601* 
 
Total Yearly 
  Income Loss  -6,258  -4,428  -2,478  -3,601 
 
Cumulative 
  Income Loss  -36,884  -13,828  -6,856  -3,601 
 
Minor Health Shock 
 
 W1-W2  W2-W3  W3-W4  W4-W5 
 
 2  -498 
 
 3  -988  20 
 
  4  -44    -3,012*  -1,423 
 
 5  -169  125  -2,680*  351 
 
Total Yearly 
  Income Loss  -1,699  -2,967  -4,103  351 
 
Cumulative 
  Income Loss  -8,727  -8,811  -6,949  351 
   33
Table 9 
Cumulative Effects of New Health Events 
 
    W1-W2 W2-W3 W3-W4  W4-W5 
 
HRS — sample 
Major Health Event 
 
Cumulative 
  Income Loss  -36,884  -13,828  -6,856  -3,601 
 
Cumulative  
  Income Loss + 
Increase Expenses   -48,941  -19,338  - 9,805  -5,901 
AHEAD — sample 
Cumulative  
  Income Loss + 
Increase Expenses     -11,346    - 3,553
 -3,005 
HRS — sample 
Minor Health Event 
Cumulative 
  Income Loss  -8,727   -8,811  -6,949  351 
 
Cumulative 
  Income Loss + 
Increase Expenses  -11,544  -11,584  - 8,610  -316 
AHEAD — sample  
 
Cumulative  
  Income Loss + 
Increase Expenses    5,926   -6,838  -702 
  Note:  AHEAD sample waves moved over one column.   34
   Table 10 
Cumulative Income Loss and Cumulative OOP Medical Expenses 
 
 
Cumulative Income Loss and OOP 
Medical Expenses    Wealth5 - Wealth1 
  Estimate “t” Estimate  “t”  Estimate “t”  Estimate “t” 
 
Intercept 30,503  0.41 21,124  0.28   91,091  0.48  44,937 0.24 
Cohort 1935-37  -34,376  -2.83 -29,081 -2.33 51,748 1.67  59,433 1.90 
Cohort 1938 Plus  -91,859  -8.55 -77,832 -7.07 36,613 1.34  56,007 2.04 
Health Excellent  -23,402  -1.30 -3,574 -0.19 -10,053 -0.22  -10,193 -0.22 
Health Very Good  -18,217  -1.12 - 8,747  -0.52 41,862 1.01  39,372 0.94 
Health Good  -1,984  0.13 5,786 0.37 32,719 0.85  39,605 1.02 
Functional 
Limitations Scale  476 1.14 378 0.88 86  0.08  215 0.20 
Female 29,223  2.93 29,905 2.92 -18,124 -0.72  -17,917 -0.68 
Black   9,920  0.72 12,035 0.85  -83,932  -2.42  -62,914 -1.80 
Hispanic 20,222  1.13 12,540 0.68 -79,374 -1.75  -59,523 -1.31 
Income 2.445  20.6    1.853  6.17  0.3064 1.14 
Wealth -0.2800  37.6 -0.2096 30.8  -0.2152  11.21   
Ed 12-15  -5,519  -0.48 15,422 1.31  16,398  0.56  15,596 0.53 
Ed College or more  -124,676  -8.20 -58,968  -3.86  134,326  3.47  122,282 3.14 
Minor Onset wave 2  13,247  0.94 11,128 0.77 -13,364  -0.37  -13,074 -0.36 
Major Onset wave 2  47,007  2.33 52,158  2.52 -78,266  -1.52  -78,130 -1.51 
R squared  .19  .14  .026   .012  
  Models also include controls for baseline prevalence of chronic conditions, regions of residence health risk 
behaviors, marital status and the presence of health insurance.   35
Table 11 
Probits for Future Onset of Chronic Condition 
 
   Major    Minor 
  Estimate Chi Square Estimate  Chi Square
 
Intercept -0.8489 10.14 -1.9624  37.91
Cohort 1935-37  -0.1920 19.78 -0.0799  4.02
Cohort 1938 Plus  -0.1888 24.99 -0.1535  19.35
Health Excellent  -0.2314 13.57 -0.2396  16.76
Health Very Good  -0.1766 9.95 -0.0951  3.17
Health Good  -0.0770 2.27 0.0302  0.37
Functional Limitations Scale  0.0041 8.63 0.0058  18.15
BMI 0.0172 1.47 0.1113  33.25
BMI squared  -0.0002 0.85 -0.0012  14.29
Vigorous exercise  -0.0786 3.94 -0.0266  0.57
Smoker 0.1523 6.68 0.0275  0.25
Number of cigs  0.0075 10.69 0.0005  0.06
More than 3 drinks  -0.1583 4.55 -0.0339  0.24
Female -0.1918 30.12 0.0360  1.25
Black -0.1245 6.70 0.1396  10.04
Hispanic -0.2994 20.40 0.0600  1.09
Income 0.0111 0.06 -0.0063  0.03
Wealth -0.0046 2.26 -0.0005  0.05
Change in stock wealth   -0.0004 0.44 0.0004  0.88
Ed 12-15  -0.1108 7.78 -0.0912  5.96
Ed College or more  -0.0844 2.43 -0.1588  10.26
  Models also control for presence of baseline chronic condition, region of residence, health insurance, and missing 
value indicators. Income and wealth measured in $100,000 of dollars and the change in stock wealth in $10,000 of 
dollars.   36
Table 12 
Probits for Future Onset of Chronic Condition 
  Any Major  Any Minor 
  Estimate  Chi Square  Estimate  Chi Square 
Income 0.0111  0.06  -0.0063  0.03 
Wealth -0.0046  2.26  -0.0005  0.05 
Ed 12-15  -0.1108  7.78  -0.0912  5.96 
Ed College or more  -0.0844  2.43  -0.1588  10.26 
Change in Stock Wealth  -0.0004  0.44  0.0004  0.88 
 
 Cancer    Hypertension 
  Estimate  Chi Square  Estimate  Chi Square 
Income 0.0130  0.05  0.0153  0.11 
Wealth -0.0030  0.53  -0.0032  1.01 
Ed 12-15  0.0008  0.00  -0.0675  2.45 
Ed College or more  0.0567  0.61  -0.0623  1.17 
Change in Stock Wealth  0.0003  0.32  -0.0001  0.11 
 
  Diseases of the Lung  Diabetes 
  Estimate  Chi Square  Estimate  Chi Square 
Income   -0.0271  0.12  0.0382  0.40 
Wealth   -0.0067  1.13  -0.0023  0.29 
Ed 12-15  -0.1920  10.32  -0.1153  4.82 
Ed College or more   -0.1432  2.67  -0.0777  1.11 
Change in Stock Wealth  0.0006  1.13  -0.0023  1.37 
 
  Heart Disease   Arthritis 
  Estimate  Chi Square  Estimate  Chi Square 
Income -0.0447  0.64  -0.0069  0.03 
Wealth 0.0015  0.19  0.0000  0.00 
Ed 12-15  -0.1086  5.10  -0.0819  4.29 
Ed College or more  -0.0519  0.62  -0.1857  12.14 
Change in Stock Wealth  -0.0012  1.36  0.0006  2.41 
 
 Stroke 
 Estimate  Chi  Square 
Income 0.0683  0.70 
Wealth -0.0175  3.83 
Ed 12-15  -0.0390  0.36 
Ed College or more  -0.0746  0.59 
Change in Stock Wealth  -0.0017  0.57 
  Models also control for other variables–see footnote to Table 11.  Income and wealth measured in $100,000 of 
dollars and the change in stock wealth in $10,000 of dollars. 
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Table 13 
Probits for Future Onset of Major Chronic Condition 
 
   Major    Major  Extended 
  Estimate Chi Square Estimate  Chi Square
 
Intercept -0.8649 10.14 -0.8963  7.12
Cohort 1935-37  -0.1920 19.78 -0.1778  14.00
Cohort 1938 Plus  -0.1888 24.99 -0.1617  13.66
Health Excellent  -0.2314 13.57 -0.2058  8.64
Health Very Good  -0.1766 9.95 -0.1629  6.79
Health Good  -0.0770 2.27 -0.0624  1.18
Functional Limitations Scale  0.0041 8.63 0.0037  5.31
BMI 0.0172 1.47 0.0199  1.66
BMI squared  -0.0002 0.85 -0.0002  1.01
Vigorous exercise  -0.0786 3.94 -0.0917  4.60
Smoker 0.1523 6.68 0.0997  2.10
Number of cigs  0.0075 10.69 0.0103  15.69
More than 3 drinks  -0.1583 4.55 -0.1669  4.22
Female -0.1918 30.12 -0.1893  20.96
Black -0.1245 6.70 -0.0556  0.97
Hispanic -0.2994 20.40 -0.2098  7.34
Income 0.0111 0.06 0.0456  0.93
Wealth -0.0046 2.26 -0.0040  1.60
Change in stock wealth   -0.0004 0.44 -0.0008  1.06
Ed 12-15  -0.1108 7.78 -0.0783  2.66
Ed College or more  -0.0844 2.43 -0.0483  0.52
Ex smoker  0.0195  0.20
Expose to hazard on job  0.0200  0.21
# of years exposed  0.0021  0.99
Memory test  0.0118  2.53
WAIS scale  -0.0001  0.00
Health Ex or VG as child  -0.0870  4.68
Not poor during childhood  -0.0949  6.31
Mother’s ed  0.0028  0.18
Father’s ed  -0.0018  0.09
Father alive   -0.1362  1.34
Age of father’s death  0.0002  0.01
Mother alive  -0.0743  0.49
Age of Mother’s death  -.00002  0.01
  Models also control for presence of baseline chronic condition, region of residence, health insurance and missing 
values.  Income and wealth measured in $100,000 of dollars and the change in stock wealth in $10,000 of dollars.   38
 
Table 14 
Probits for Future Onset of Minor Chronic Condition 
   Minor    Minor  Extended 
  Estimate Chi Square Estimate  Chi Square
Intercept -1.9624 38.19 -1.7780  21.54
Cohort 1935-37  -0.0799 4.06 -0.1122  6.58
Cohort 1938 Plus  -0.1535 19.29 -0.1761  19.12
Health Excellent  -0.2396 16.65 -0.2488  14.57
Health Very Good  -0.0951 2.96 -0.0805  1.83
Health Good  0.0302 0.37 0.0224  0.16
Functional Limitations Scale  0.0058 18.39 0.0060  15.50
BMI 0.1113 32.97 0.1187  31.13
BMI squared  -0.0012 13.99 -0.0013  13.40
Vigorous exercise  -0.0266 0.42 -0.0231  0.38
Smoker 0.0275 0.24 0.0495  0.60
Number of cigs  0.0005 0.07 0.0014  0.30
More than 3 drinks  -0.0339 0.30 -0.0271  0.13
Female 0.0360 1.24 0.0704  3.49
Black 0.1396 9.96 0.1366  7.00
Hispanic 0.0600 1.22 0.0614  0.83
Income -0.0063 0.02 -0.0044  0.01
Wealth -0.0005 0.00 -0.0001  0.00
Change in stock wealth  0.0004 0.88 0.0003  0.75
Ed 12-15  -0.0912 6.02 -0.0527  1.38
Ed College or more  -0.1588 10.46 -0.0927  2.33
Ex smoker  0.0536  2.12
Expose to hazard on job  -0.0261  0.44
# of years exposed  0.0007  0.12
Memory test  -0.0055  0.68
WAIS scale  -0.0035  0.28
Health Ex or VG as child  0.0042  0.01
Not poor during childhood  0.0155  0.20
Mother’s ed  0.0004  0.00
Father’s ed  -0.0046  0.72
Father alive   -0.2001  3.32
Age of father’s death  -0.0014  0.88
Mother alive  -0.2465  6.51
Age of Mother’s death  -.00028  4.60
  Models also control for presence of baseline chronic condition, region of residence, health insurance and missing 
values. Income and wealth measured in $100,000 of dollars and the change in stock wealth in $10,000 of dollars.   39
Appendix Table A 
Types of Government Insurance 
 
No New Health Event  1  2  3  4  5 
Medicare  37.8 44.5  59.5  75.6 81.4 
Medicaid 15.7  13.2  12.0  6.1  4.2 
Champus  37.7  30.5  19.5 10.5 5.8 
Medicare and Medicaid  3.3  4.1  6.9  5.9  5.7 




Severe Health Event, Wave 1 - 2  1  2  3  4  5 
Medicare  40.8 50.7  62.7  73.8 74.4 
Medicaid 21.8  22.3  16.4  8.1  4.8 
Champus  26.2 15.1 6.5  4.7  4.1 
Medicare and Medicaid  2.4  7.4  13.1  11.1  15.6 




Minor Health Event, Wave 1 - 2  1  2  3  4  5 
Medicare  37.3 51.9  62.2  75.1 79.0 
Medicaid 19.7  14.8  16.0  6.0  4.7 
Champus 28.0  21.4  10.7  7.3  5.5 
Medicare  and  Medicaid  3.8 4.4  9.3 10.1 9.8 
All  other  11.0 7.5  1.9  1.5 1.1 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
  